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This paper considers the relationship between growth in real per capita GDP and the growth 
in real per capita GDP of the poorest 20% of a country.  It uses the data set compiled by 
Dollar and Kraay (2002), but come to very different conclusions.  We argue that if the 
purpose is to answer questions about the impact of growth on the poor, models are best 
estimated in growth rates.  The empirical results show that growth’s impact on the poor 
occurs in two episodes.  First, in periods of sustained economic slowdown (negative growth 
over a period of at least 5 years), the poor clearly suffer more than the average.  In contrast, 
where economies are growing, the poor do not benefit as much as the average.  We also find 
that the poor benefit from growth less in periods of high inflation, and in countries with low 
average income. 
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  21. Introduction 
 
The question of whether economic growth is good for the poor is a hotly contested one, 
bringing out passions and prejudices on both sides of the debate.  In a recent contribution, 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) have constructed a large data set from various sources which 
includes, among other variables, the real per capita GDP of the poorest 20% for a given 
country and the real per capita GDP for the whole country.
1  They present empirical evidence 
which supports the view that there is a one-for-one relationship between overall economic 
growth, and growth in incomes of the poor.   
 
In this paper we use the Dollar-Kraay data set to investigate the possibility that the 
relationship between overall economic growth and growth in incomes of the poor is not stable 
across the whole cycle of economic activity.  In particular, we consider the possibility of 
different outcomes for the poor when an economy is growing compared to when it is 
experiencing contraction.  Some acknowledgement has been made in the literature of the 
possibility that outcomes for the poor may differ in these two cases.  For example, Ravallion 
(2001) concludes, based on some recent household survey data, that “on average, growth is 
poverty reducing, and contraction is poverty increasing” (Ravallion, 2001, p.1806).
2  The 
Dollar-Kraay data set provides an excellent opportunity to explore this question with a much 
more diverse set of data across longer time spans. 
 
The empirical analysis confirms the existence of two distinct scenarios: cases where growth in 
real GDP per capita is positive, and cases where it is negative.  In the former case, where 
countries are expanding, the estimated model suggests that on average, the poor do not 
experience all the benefits of growth – an increase in average incomes of 1% corresponds to 
an increase in incomes of the poor of around 0.7%.  In the latter case, where countries are 
contracting over a five-year period (or longer), a coefficient of around 1.4 suggests that where 
the per capita income falls, it is the poor who suffer more than proportionately – a 1% fall in 
per capita income leads, on average, to a 1.4% fall in income of the poor. 
 
A further outcome of the analysis we undertake in this paper is a critique of the methodology 
used in the Dollar-Kraay study.  The main tool of the Dollar-Kraay analysis is a series of 
regressions where the dependent variable is the real per capita GDP of the poorest 20% for 
various countries and various time periods, and the main explanatory variable of interest is the 
corresponding real per capita GDP for the whole country.  Different models are estimated 
with various other explanatory variables and dummy variables, and various estimation 
techniques – OLS and instrumental variables.  Almost regardless of the model chosen, their 
  3results show a close to one-for-one correspondence between income of the poor and overall 
income.  On this basis, they conclude: “within countries, incomes of the poor on average rise 
equi-proportionately with average incomes… This basic finding ... holds across regions, time 
periods, growth rates and income levels” (Dollar and Kraay 2002, p. 196). 
 
In section 2 of this paper we will argue that the Dollar-Kraay analysis is based on a mis-
specified model, and that when an appropriate specification is used, the conclusions are quite 
different.  The key issue is that the Dollar-Kraay estimates do not adequately allow for 
differing effects during contraction and expansion phases.  We demonstrate that in order to 
explore the possibility of a different relationship in times of contraction or expansion, it is 
necessary to consider the relationship between growth rates in income of the poor and growth 
rates in overall income.  This differenced model also removes the country-specific fixed 
effects, so that the dominant variation being modelled is within country variation.   More 
fundamentally, we argue that the model in growth rates more closely answers the question 
about whether growth really does benefit the poor.   
 
The debate over the connection between growth and inequality has been approached from 
many angles, and various conclusions drawn.  Pioneering work by Kuznets (1955) and others 
suggested a complex story whereby early stages of development are accompanied by 
increasing inequality, but eventually this increasing disparity disappears as the benefits of 
development are distributed.  The causality in this possible relationship between inequality 
and growth is ambiguous.  Some authors focus on the potential effects of inequality on 
growth, and find results in both directions – some evidence suggests that more unequal 
societies tend to grow more slowly (e.g. Perotti 1996), whilst others find the opposite (e.g. 
Forbes 2000).  Other authors explore the possibility that growth in average income might 
affect the well being of the poor.  Again, effects go in both directions, but authors of the most 
recent empirical results tend towards the conclusion that the poorest share proportionately in 
growth in income (e.g. Deininger and Squire 1996, Dollar and Kraay 2002). 
 
There are sound economic reasons to expect the poor to suffer more than the average in times 
of recession.  First, consider the likely labour market implications of an economic downturn.  
Lower productivity will mean a lower demand for labour, and employers faced with the need 
to reduce their work force are likely to show a preference towards reducing numbers among 
their unskilled work force rather than skilled employees.  This is because the employer has 
invested more in training of the skilled worker, and would anticipate higher costs of 
recruitment when their demand rises again.  Consequently, when recession comes, the lower 
paid unskilled workers are more likely to end up unemployed, and in most cases, this has 
  4serious consequences for their economic wellbeing.  Secondly, economic downturn often has 
implications for the availability of credit (Agenor, 2002).  Banks and other lenders will be 
aware of increased risk of default in times of economic contraction; this could result in a 
higher risk premium being built into the interest rate, and / or a degree of credit rationing.  
Those most vulnerable to such rationing are likely to be small and medium-size firms, which 
tend to be more reliant on credit than larger firms.  These small and medium sized firms also 
often use more labour intensive means of production, particularly low skilled labour.  The 
employment implications of the credit rationing are again likely to affect the low income, 
unskilled worker more than the average person.  Of course, assessing the relevance or strength 
of these effects is an empirical question, one which we hope to address in a broad sense 
through the results in this paper.    
 
While empirical evidence is very important to understanding economic realities, it is well 
recognised that there are many dangers in drawing sweeping conclusions from reasonably 
simple cross-country studies.  Temple (1999) highlights problems associated with the 
assumption of parameter homogeneity when samples include such widely varying countries 
and time periods, the effect of outliers resulting from one-off catastrophic events in a specific 
country, sensitivity of models to the choice of regressors, potential endogeneity of regressors, 
measurement error, and omitted regional effects.  This paper is vulnerable to most of these 
criticisms.  We thus make rather modest claims based on the empirical results.  We do not 
claim to have solved the mysteries surrounding the connection between growth and the 
wellbeing of the poor.  Instead, we have highlighted some striking empirical realities, which 
challenge some dominant views, and hopefully prompt further more detailed research at a 
country-by-country level.   
 
2. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
 
The data for this study was compiled by Dollar and Kraay (2002), and details of sources can 
be found in the Appendix to their paper.  In this section we will briefly outline some issues 
with the definition and construction of the data. 
 
First, there is a range of views on just how one should define “the poor” – some focus on 
relative poverty, and others on absolute poverty.  Some are income based, and others are 
consumption-based.  Some look at headcounts, others seek to capture the depth of poverty by 
more sophisticated measures.  Since the focus of this study is on the relationship between 
overall economic growth and the well-being of the poorest section of society, it is natural to 
examine relative measures: we are interested primarily in whether the poorer portion of 
  5society experience the same benefits of growth as those in the middle and upper sections of 
the income distribution.  The choice of the average income among the poorest 20% is 
somewhat arbitrary, but also driven by data availability and the need to settle on one simple 
measure that indicates the distributional effects of growth.  While this measure may well miss 
important income redistributions (for example, if a regressive government policy initiative 
improves the well-being of all, at the expense of the poorest 10%, it may not affect the 
relative position of the average person in the poorest 20% category), in such an extensive 
cross-country study covering a long time span, these problems are unlikely to produce any 
systematic difficulties.   
 
The choice of income (or more precisely, real GDP per capita) as the metric of economic 
well-being rather than some consumption measure is partly driven by pragmatism, in that 
income data is much more readily available, allowing a much wider range of countries and 
time periods to be included in the sample.  Real GDP per capita data were sourced primarily 
from the Penn World Tables, with more recent updates coming from the World Bank 
database. 
 
Measuring the income of the poorest 20% is not straightforward.  In most cases Dollar and 
Kraay were able to rely on data that use household surveys which provide quite detailed 
estimates of the distribution of income.   However, some estimates were obtained from an 
income distribution based on an estimated Gini coefficient and assuming income follows a 
lognormal distribution.  The final data set represents a combination of data from several 
different sources, but the majority come from UN-WIDER (2000) and Deininger and Squire 
(1996). 
 
The culmination of this data collection is a set of 418 observations on real per capita GDP and 
real per capita GDP of the poorest 20% for 133 countries.  The data set contains at least two 
observations  per country, with at most eight.  The earliest time period is 1956, and the most 
recent observation occurs in 1999.  Each time observation is separated by at least 5 years, 
with a median length of time between observations of 6 years. 
 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of observations on the log of real per capita GDP country-wide 
and log real per capita GDP of the poorest 20%.  This figure reproduces Dollar and Kraay’s 
Figure 1.  From Figure 1, it is not difficult to see how a significant positive one-for-one 
relationship between average GDP per capita and GDP of the poor could be found.  Casual 
empiricism would clearly indicate this relationship.   
 
  6Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of observations on the average annual growth rate of real per 
capita GDP country-wide and average annual growth rate in real per capita GDP of the 
poorest 20%.  Average growth rates are calculated for whatever length of time there is 
between consecutive observations.  This figure reproduces Dollar and Kraay’s Figure 2. 
 
One impression derived from Figure 2 is that there does still seem to be a positive relationship 
between the two variables, although the relationship is not as clear cut – there is a lot more 
noise in growth rates than there is in levels of output.  The other striking feature evident from 
Figure 2 is that there are a substantial number of observations where growth rates were 
negative.  For 51 of the 285 observations, real per capita GDP showed negative growth over 
the five-year (or longer) period.  These observations are particularly interesting, as they raise 
the question of how the poor fare in a contracting or slowing economy.  It is one thing to ask 
how they will benefit as overall growth takes place, but it is equally interesting to examine the 
impact of an overall economic contraction on the poorest 20%.  Again, first impressions from 
Figure 2 are that the poor certainly share in the pain of contraction: in 88% of the periods of 
negative overall growth, the poorest 20% also experienced a decline in real per capita GDP. 
 
Table 1 presents some interesting statistics in this regard.  It indicates a pattern about when 
the poor do particularly badly relative to the overall average.  In a nutshell, when there has 
been serious economic contraction, indicated by average growth rates of worse than –6% per 
annum, the poor have suffered extremely badly – they almost always do worse than the 
average, with a decline in income that is, on average, 6.61% worse than that of the overall 
economy.  At the other extreme, when economies have been growing strongly – average 
growth of above 6%, the poor have averaged a growth rate 2.34% below the overall average, 
growing more slowly in 70% of cases.  In the intervening area, patterns are not as easy to 
identify, except possibly for the observation that when growth is in the slow and steady region 
of between 0% and 3% per annum, the poor do slightly better than the average.  These 
phenomena certainly bear closer examination, and the results in section 4 will shed further 
light on the question. 
 
3. Estimation Issues 
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where   is the log per capita income of country i at time period t in the poorest quintile,   
is the corresponding log per capita income of the whole country, z  is a k x 1 vector of other 




θi  is an unobserved country-specific effect.  The 
parameter of primary interest is β1, the coefficient of  .  If  yit β1 takes the value 1, then a 1% 
higher value of per capita income corresponds to a 1% higher value of income of the poorest 
20%.  A value below 1 suggests that the poor do not benefit one-for-one from overall growth. 
 
The difficulty with estimating Equation (1) by standard ordinary least squares (OLS) is with 
the presence of the unobserved θi  in the error term.  θi  captures non-time varying 
characteristics of individual countries which might impact the relationship between   and 
.  The critical issue is that 
yit
yit
P θi  is likely to be correlated with the regressor  , and possibly 




There are a number of possible solutions to this problem.  A straightforward option is to 
estimate (1) in first differences: once Equation (1) is differenced, θi  disappears from the 
model, and the β’s can be estimated consistently by regressing ∆yit
P on ∆yit and other 
regressors.  An alternative approach involves use of a Generalised method of moments 
(GMM) or instrumental variables (IV) estimator, where Equation (1) is estimated with ∆  
as the instrument for  .  Provided y  does not follow a random walk process, there will be 
correlation between   and its instrument, and it is not unreasonable to assume that ∆  is 








Dollar and Kraay adopt a variation on this instrumental variables approach, using a systems 
GMM estimator, where (1) is estimated in both levels and differences, with ∆  serving as 
instrument for  , and   being the instrument for 
yit−1
yit yit−1 ∆yit.  The systems estimator is designed 
to exploit more orthogonality conditions than the standard IV estimator, and therefore to 
provide greater precision. 
 
I would argue that the systems estimator used by Dollar and Kraay does not deliver the 
benefits they seek in this case, and that the differenced estimator is a more suitable choice.  
First, the systems estimator introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) was specifically designed for the dynamic panel context, where the model contains a 
lag of the dependent variable as a regressor.  It is not invalid in the static panel context, but 
  8there is no evidence to suggest it yields improved precision.  In fact, the simulation analyses 
performed in the above papers demonstrate that when there are no dynamics in the data 
generating process, the performance of the difference estimator and the systems estimator is 
virtually identical.  Secondly, and more fundamentally, the performance of any GMM or IV 
estimator is crucially dependent on the quality of the instruments.  There is a wide literature 
on the issue of weak instruments, and the general message is that when one faces problems 
with weak instruments, estimates can be a long way from the true parameter values.  Dollar 
and Kraay’s choice of instruments is certainly in this category.  Dollar and Kraay’s Table 3 
present the estimates from the first stage regressions of each regressor and its instrument.  
They do not include r
2 values, but when computed, we find that for the regression of y  on its 
instrument ∆ , the r
it
yit−1
2 is 2.3%.  This is an extremely low r
2, indicating a very weak 
instrument.  Estimates based on this kind of instrument could be wildly inaccurate. 
 
The third reason for preferring the differenced estimator is the difficulty in allowing for 
differing relationships between growth in income of the poor and overall growth in times of 
growth and contraction.  Dollar and Kraay consider this possibility by adding to their levels 
model a dummy variable that allows for different effects when growth is negative.  However, 
it is easy to demonstrate that this does not capture the effect that we are considering.   
 
Effectively, Dollar and Kraay’s approach involves adding a further regressor to Equation (1): 
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The idea is to capture the marginal effect of overall growth on the income of the poor through 
β1 when growth is positive, and through β β 13 +  when growth is negative.  However, we 
can show by differencing Equation (2) that the interpretation is not that clear: 
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 and   are negative, and will equal zero if both 







∆yit ∆yit  and ∆yit−1 are positive.  If 
 and  ∆yit > 0 ∆yit− < 1 0, then  , and if the signs of  ∆() yy it it
−
− =− 1 ∆yit  and   are 
reversed,  .  This rather confusing scenario makes it difficult to determine just 
what we learn from the parameter 
∆yit−1
∆() yy it it
− =
β3.  At its most informative, it tells us about the 
differential effect of overall on growth in incomes of the poor when there are two consecutive 
periods of negative growth, compared to two consecutive periods of positive growth.  Bear in 
mind that each time period spans at least 5 years, and in the sample we have, there are only 6 
occurrences of two consecutive periods of negative growth.  Any estimate based on so few 
episodes will be very unreliable.  Furthermore, when one takes into account the “mixed” 
outcomes, where growth switches from positive to negative or vice versa, it is clear that β3 
tells us little about the question we are concerned with.  In the light of this discussion, it is not 
surprising that Dollar and Kraay found that there was no significant effect, and concluded that 
there is no asymmetry in growth outcomes for the poor between expansion and contraction. 
 
In contrast, the addition of an appropriate dummy variable into the differenced equation 
provides for the differential effect in quite a straightforward way.   Difference Equation (1) 
again, and augment the equation with  , where   when ∆ , and is zero 
otherwise.  This produces 
∆yit
− ∆∆ y it it
− = y yit < 0
 
∆∆ ∆ ∆ yy y z it
P
it it it it = e + + + +
− β β δ β 01 2
' .   (3) 
 
Under this model, the effects of overall growth, when that growth is positive, on growth in 
incomes of the poor is captured by the coefficient β1, while when growth is negative, the 
impact on the incomes of the poor is captured by β δ 1 + .  This model provides a natural and 
straightforward way of identifying these possible differential effects.  Equation (3) provides 
the basis for the analysis we report in section 4.   
 
Observe that the proposed model includes other possible explanatory variables z .  We 
consider a range of measures of policy actions and economic or social conditions which might  
it
have some impact on the income share of the poor.  The variables considered in the analysis 
are based on those used by Dollar and Kraay.  The first set of variables seek to capture what 
conventional economic wisdom regards as sound policy: low inflation, small government, a 
sizeable commercial banking sector, and openness to trade.  Inclusion of these variables 
  10allows us to test the view that many policy initiatives in these directions, while they may be 
helpful to growth, work against the interests of the poor, and hence increase inequality.  
Another set of variables are indicators of policy measures that might be regarded as more 
specifically pro-poor: investment in education, development of a stable society, and 
maintaining the agricultural sector.  Their inclusion will allow us to find whether there is 
evidence supporting the view that these are important contributors to outcomes for the poor. 
 
Most data is found in the World Bank’s various databases, with some coming from a range of 
other sources.  Details can be found in the Appendix to Dollar and Kraay (2002).   The 
variables, each of which fall into one of seven categories, are: 
-  Regional dummy variables (there are seven regions: East Asia and Pacific, Europe 
and Central Asia, Middle East and Northern Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and North America),  
-  Indicators of sound policy: inflation rate, government consumption, commercial bank 
assets as a proportion of total bank assets,  
-  Measures of openness: trade volume (exports plus imports) as a proportion of GDP, 
Sachs-Warner index of openness, import tax revenue as a share of imports, a dummy 
variable equalling one if the country is a member of the WTO, and a dummy variable 
equalling one if the International Monetary Fund judges that the country has 
restrictions on international capital flows, 
-  Indices of social stability: an index of rule of law, an index indicating strength of 
formal democratic institutions,  
-  Measures of educational outcomes: years of secondary schooling per worker, years of 
primary education per capita, 
-  Indicators of agricultural output: amount of arable land per worker, labour 
productivity in agriculture relative to economy-wide labour productivity, 





The estimation results are given in Table 2.  In Columns (1) and (2) we consider the simpler 
model where no extra explanatory variables are included in the model besides the growth in 
income.  The estimates in Column (1) appear to support the general claims made by Dollar 
and Kraay (2002) and others that the poor benefit at least proportionately from economic 
growth.  However, the story changes when we allow for the possibility of a structural break.  
Column (2) presents estimates when we allow the response of income of the poor to changes 
  11in per capita GDP to be different depending on whether growth is positive or negative.  
Results indicate that the estimated impact of positive growth on the poor is somewhat below 
1.  They suggest that an increase in growth rate of GDP by 1% will see an increase in growth 
rate of average income of the poor of around 0.78%.  In contrast, when growth is negative, its 
impact on the poor is substantially higher, suggesting that a drop of 1% in real per capita GDP 
leads to a fall in real per capita GDP of the poorest 20% of around 1.7%, on average.  That is, 
in times of economic crisis – periods where an economy contracts over 5 or more years – the 
poor suffer around a 70% greater loss than the overall average.   
 
The remaining columns of Table 2 present a selection of results where we include the various 
other explanatory variables in the model.  We will not show results for all the various 
combinations of variables: there are 22 possible variables, and therefore a vast number of 
possible combinations.  Column (3) of Table 2 shows an all-encompassing model including 
the regional dummies (excluding North America as the base), the three indicators of sound 
policy, the two indices of social stability, and the two indicators of agricultural output.  For 
the other three categories, we include the variable from each category which has the t statistic 
farthest from zero, these being primary education, the WTO membership dummy variable, 
and lag of real GDP per capita.  It is apparent from Column (3) that not many variables are 
significant.  Apart from the GDP growth variable, only the inflation measure has a significant 
t statistic.  Of course, as some variables are eliminated, certain other variables which are 
currently not significant may become significant.  Consequently, a range of different paths 
were followed to eliminate selected variables and then re-estimate.  The results of these steps 
appear in column (4) of the table.  This model includes only statistically significant variables.  
In fact, no other variables were significant in any of the many alternative specifications tried.  
The preferred model thus includes only the inflation rate and the lag of real GDP per capita as 
additional variables
3.  We state the estimated equation as follows: 
 
( 1
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 It is of some relevance that so many of the other variables considered were not significant.  
This implies there is no evidence that these variables have an influence on the share of growth 
which is claimed by the poorest 20% of societies.  For example, none of the measures of 
openness were significant.  We find no connection between the degree of openness of an 
economy and the extent to which the poor reap the benefits of growth.  This finding is 
relevant to much of the public debate about so-called pro-growth policies.  It is often claimed 
that such policies have detrimental impact on the poor.  This study has been unable to find 
  12such impact on the economic situation of the poor.  Of course, such a connection may exist, 
but this analysis is unable to find any significant evidence for it. 
 
Turning to the coefficients in equation (4), we see first that when growth is positive, the 
model predicts that an improvement in growth of 1% will see an improvement in growth for 
the poor of only 0.71%.  In other words, the poor benefit less than the average in times of 
growth.  Now consider times of negative growth
4.  In this case, a coefficient of 1.41 suggests 
that a decline in growth of 1% will lead to a greater decline in growth of incomes of the poor 
of around 1.41%.  In other words, the poor suffer more than the average in times of 
contraction.  The negative coefficient on the inflation variable suggests that higher inflation 
has detrimental implications for the poor: a period of 10% inflation, for example, corresponds 
to a 0.35% per annum lower growth rate in incomes of the poor relative to overall income.
5  
This result is not surprising: there are several reasons to believe that inflation tends to increase 
inequality.  First, the poor tend to spend a higher proportion of their income on consumption 
spending, particularly food, and hence can suffer more immediately the effects of inflation.  
Secondly, inflation tends to favour those who own property and other appreciating assets, and 
the poorest 20% rarely find themselves in this category.   Instead, the poor are often wage 
earners or in informal self-employment, where increases in income often lag inflation.  
Thirdly, high inflation often has a detrimental effect on export revenue in the local currency, 
which could hurt the poor in a number of ways.  For example, consider a low income worker 
producing a raw commodity (e.g. Coffee) for export in an international market.  The price 
they receive for their commodity is determined in this international market, in US dollars.  If 
their local economy experiences high inflation, this will lead to a depreciation of their 
currency, and reduced earnings from their commodity, in their local currency.  The net effect 
is that they face higher prices and lower income. 
 
The final variable in the model is lagged GDP.  It has a positive coefficient in the estimated 
equation, suggesting that the higher a country’s level of GDP per capita, the more the poor 
benefit from growth.  Specifically, if a country has a GDP per capita which is double that of 
another, this corresponds to a difference in logs of around 0.69, and hence means the poor in 
the wealthier country will experience growth which is 0.1% higher per annum than those in 
the poorer country.  While this effect is small in magnitude, it is not surprising.  A wealthier 
country will most likely have a more developed social welfare system, and a progressive tax 
structure, whereby their low income earners can benefit from growth.  In less developed 
countries, whether the poor benefit may depend much more on which sectors are driving the 
growth, and on other political factors. 
 
  13Figure 3 presents various scenarios for the model’s predictions of the relationship between 
overall growth and growth in incomes of the poor, given particular values for inflation and 
GDP.  In each case, when the fitted model line is above the “inequality neutral” 45 degree 
line, the poor are expected to fare better than the average.  Conversely, values below the line 
indicate a worse performance for the poor compared to the average.  The worst outcome for 
the poor is shown in Figure 3b, where the model predicts that, regardless of the overall growth 
rate, the poor never do as well as the average.  This is a situation of a low income country 
($400) with quite high inflation (40%).  In this case, sometimes the poor can fare very badly 
relative to the average: for example, with average growth of 2%, the model predicts growth 
for the poor of just over 1%; when average growth is 5%, the model predicts a 3.3% outcome 
for the poor.  Likewise during contraction, a 2% decline sees a 3% decline for the poor, and 
the gap widens for more drastic periods of recession. 
 
Being a higher income country slightly alleviates the impact on the poor (compare Figure 3d 
with Figure 3b), however a lower inflation rate is the more influential factor.  For example, 
Figure 3a shows that for an equally poor country whose inflation rate is only 10%, there is a 
range of values for which the poor grow slightly faster than the average: -1.4% to 2.0% 
growth.  However, the pattern remains of inferior outcomes for the poor whenever 
contractions are sizeable, or whenever growth is significant. 
 
There is some discussion in the introduction to this paper as to why one might expect the poor 
to suffer more in times of sizeable economic downturn.  Essentially, the poor are the most 
vulnerable to the associated tightening that comes with recession – lower demand for labour 
will often squeeze out the low paid unskilled worker, credit becomes more costly or scarce as 
the risk of default increases, and falls in Government tax revenue can lead to a decline in 
government spending oriented towards supporting the poor.  It is striking to note that in 
addition, the estimated model predicts that the poor will not benefit as much as the average in 
times of rapid economic growth.  Table 1 supports this finding, showing that among those 
countries which experienced growth in excess of 6% per annum, the average overall growth 
rate was 7.47%, while the poor in these countries experienced average growth of only 5.13%.  
What this result suggests is that different sources of growth can have varying implications for 
the poor.  In general, sustained real per capita growth of 5% or even higher cannot come from 
steadily growing, broad based expansion in economic activity.  Growth of this magnitude 
would usually require some large external stimulus (such as a resource boom), or possibly a 
significant shift in the domestic economic and political environment that allows previously 
restricted potential economic activity to be released (for example, dramatic opening up of a 
previously closed economy and political system).  It is quite plausible that growth driven from 
  14such sources will by its nature not benefit a broad cross-section of the economy, at least in the 
short term. 
  
As an example of the former, consider the experience of Botswana.  Botswana has 
experienced excellent growth over the last 30 years (the average GDP growth rate between 
1961 and 1997 was 7.5%), mostly driven by the emergence of diamond mining industry.  In 
2002, more than 45% of the country’s GDP was associated with diamonds.  At the same time, 
many of Botswana’s inequality and poverty measures have at best remained steady at 
unsatisfactory levels and in some cases are worsening.  The Gini coefficient is currently at a 
very high 0.60.  It seems that the growth induced by diamond mining has not created a 
sufficiently broad base of employment and other growth to benefit many of the country’s poor 
(Clover 2003).   
 
China’s economic experience presents another striking example.  Dollar and Kraay’s 
estimates of China’s Gini coefficient show an increase from 27.9 in 1980 to 41.5 in 1995.  
This represents a massive increase in inequality, during a period where growth was extremely 
healthy.  Evidence suggests this trend has continued since 1995.  Decomposition of the 
sources of inequality highlights the fact that most of the growth has come through the boom in 
the manufacturing sector, centred largely in urban areas, particularly in the coastal provinces, 
as China embarked on its economic reform agenda (Chang 2002).  Little growth has been 
experienced among the vast rural population, who mostly continue as peasant farmers, with 
large supplies of surplus labour.  This is the critical factor in seeing such large increases in 
inequality.   
 
These observations raise some important implications for how periods of economic 
contraction and rapid expansion are managed, in terms of their impact on society’s most 
economically vulnerable.  Clearly further analysis is needed before one could claim to have 
categorically identified the structural causes of any possible increased inequality.  Hopefully, 
the empirical regularities we have highlighted here might give some impetus to further 
research in this direction, at both the theoretical and empirical level.  
 
The final observation concerning the model estimated in this paper is a comment on model 
accuracy: the preferred model has a standard error of 0.037, suggesting that “average” errors 
are quite high.  Growth in income for the poorest 20% typically ranges from –10% to +10%, 
so to be able to predict this dependent variable to within only 3.7% on average is not a great 
outcome.  There are clearly many other factors influencing outcomes for the poor other than 
those considered in this study.  There is still much to learn about the mechanisms of how 
  15income distributions vary between countries and across time; meanwhile, predictions for what 




In a recent insightful analysis, Kanbur (2001) seeks to bring some understanding of the 
differences in viewpoint held by various stakeholders in the development world.  Kanbur 
categorises the stakeholders into two groups: Group A comprises mostly economic analysts 
and policy managers, those who work in finance ministries in the developed world, and policy 
makers in the multilateral banks and international financial institutions.  Group B comprises 
mostly non-government aid and lobbying organisations, some UN specialised agencies, and 
academics in non-economic disciplines.  Whilst he acknowledges that any such categorisation 
is an over-simplification, Kanbur highlights significant points of disagreement between the 
two schools of thought.  In the arena of economic growth, Group A members will often 
accuse Group B of being “anti-growth”, while Group B characterises Group A as believing 
that “growth is everything”.  Policies seen as “growth oriented” by Group A are described as 
“economic policies which hurt the poor” by Group B.     
 
Kanbur urges both sides of this debate to take the time to listen to and understand the other’s 
point of view.  He considers the debate as the “Growth Red Herring” (Kanbur 2001, section 
7).  There is little doubt that both sides of the debate favour economic growth per se (subject 
to its possible environmental or social / cultural externalities).  Instead, “The real debate to be 
engaged is on the policy package and the consequences of different elements of it for 
distribution and poverty” (Kanbur 2001, p.13).  It is the policies for how growth is achieved 
around which the real disagreements centre. 
 
What we believe this paper has contributed to this debate is a reminder that simply pursuing 
growth, as defined by increases in average income, will not necessarily reap benefits for the 
poor.  Dollar and Kraay (2002, p. 219) draw strong policy implications from their 
econometric analysis: “… growth on average does benefit the poor as much as anyone else in 
society, and so standard growth-enhancing policies should be at the centre of any effective 
poverty reduction strategy”.  We have demonstrated that such conclusions are not warranted 
by the data.  The link between within country growth and inequality can best be understood 
by models of growth, rather than models of income levels.  Our results suggest a few 
important findings: first, that the poor suffer more than proportionately in times of economic 
crisis.  This point alone needs further investigation and policy attention.  Secondly, the only 
direct link we can find between policy and inequality is with the role of inflation: there is 
  16strong evidence that high inflation is bad for the poor.  Thirdly, there is some evidence that 
the poor in low income countries – undoubtedly the most vulnerable of the world’s poor - are 
likely to benefit less from growth than those in high income countries.   
 
Finally, despite an extensive analysis of the possible factors influencing outcomes for the 
poor, we have ended up with a model which still leaves much unexplained.  Any suggestion 
that the pursuit of growth via “growth-enhancing policies” will inevitably lead to beneficial 
outcomes for the poor is certainly not supported by the data: there are many possible factors 
which will lead to a range of possible outcomes.  It would seem essential to accompany such 
growth oriented policies with other measures that seek to ensure that the poor benefit from 
this growth, and that protect the poor in times of economic crisis.   
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  18Table 1 
Comparison of Growth in Incomes of the Poor with Growth in Overall Income 
 
 






Mean Growth in 
Overall Income 
Mean Growth in 




Below  -6%  9  -8.57%  -15.18%  0.89 
-6%  to  –3%  15  -4.04%  -4.09%  0.33 
-3%  to  0%  27  -1.13%  -2.56%  0.63 
0%  to  3%  138  1.61%  1.98%  0.47 
3%  to  6%  76  4.49%  4.28%  0.50 





















































 Central Asia 
   -0.0193 
(-1.16) 
 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
    0.0002       
 (0.02) 
 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
   -0.0095 
(-0.78) 
 
South Asia     -0.0028 
(-0.17) 
 





   -0.0671 
(-0.80) 
 






   -0.0317 
(-1.50) 
 
Rule of Law      0.0061       
 (0.81) 
 





   -0.0150 
(-1.37) 
 
Arable Land     -0.0019 
(-0.62) 
 
Primary Education     -0.0031 
(-0.66) 
 
WTO Membership      0.0074       
 (0.90) 
 
Lag GDP      0.0052       
(0.72) 





0.494  0.528  0.586 
  Figures in parentheses are t statistics. 
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Figure 2 
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  22Figure 3 
Model Predictions for How the Poor Benefit from Growth: 
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Figure 3c
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1 The data set covers 133 countries, and includes over 400 observations.  For some countries, 
data is available for only one year, whilst other countries have up to 8 observations.  No two 
observations are less than 5 years apart. 
 
2 In a related example, Easterly (2001) finds some evidence that in cases where an economy is 
contracting, the effect of structural adjustment loans on the poor is different to those cases 
where the economy is expanding.   
 
3 Note that the preferred model does not include a constant term.  The constant term was not 
significant, and there are reasons to believe that it ought not be included in a growth rate 
model.  When the constant term is added to the model presented in equation (4), the 
coefficient is –0.004, with a very small t statistic of 0.18, and other coefficients are almost 
identical to those shown in equation (4). 
 
4 Recall that ∆yit is growth in GDP over a period of at least 5 years, so a negative value 
reflects a period of sustained poor economic performance. 
 
5 The data set includes some rather extreme values of the inflation measure.  For example, 
certain Latin American countries had sustained periods of hyperinflation during the early 
1990s.  I was concerned that the significance of the inflation variable may have been driven 
by just a few very influential observations on this variable.  To examine this, the model was 
rerun omitting seven observations with particularly high inflation values.  This produced a 
similar coefficient, although the t-statistic dropped from 4.12 to 2.23.  We thus conclude that 
the effect of inflation is somewhat influenced by these extreme values, but does seem to also 
be present in more modest inflationary periods.  